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• "… the age of photography corresponds precisely to the explosion of the private into the public, or rather into the creation of a new social value, which is the publicity of the private: the private is consumed as such, publicly." This paper focuses on the possible contribution that the Internet can make, and is making, to the development of such novel decision-making structures. In particular, it examines whether the Internet can offer ways to incorporate the public more meaningfully into the infrastructure of global legal regimes. The capacity of the Internet to short-cut barriers of space and time, makes it, at least prima facie, the ideal medium for transnational deliberation. Indeed, this has been shown, somewhat ironically, by the fact that the Internet has played a major role in facilitating the protests against various global regimes. Protestors have used the Internet extensively, both to publicize their critique and, more instrumentally, to coordinate their actions. Websites such as Protest.Net, www.indymedia.org, www.WebActive.com and www.corpwatch.org have turned into 'hubs' of political communication. All of these websites include details of upcoming protests, action alerts, and links to other protest websites. The extensive political usage of the Net has even led some commentators to assert that the Internet could revolutionize the face of global politics. However, despite the impressive growth of civic protest over the Internet, the use of the Web to include the public in transnational governance processes appears to be very limited. The question remains, therefore, whether the Internet has indeed the capacity to foster more inclusive structures of global law-making.
The paper addresses this question in three stages. First, the traditional conception of transnational governance is reviewed and its weaknesses for understanding and addressing the issues raised by the emerging system of global law are identified. A more contemporary interpretation of international regime formation is then presented that requires a democratic and truly global decision-making forum. Second, the role of the Internet as a means of realizing such ambitions is explored, using the idea of politics as a problem of 'collective action'. The discussion presents a simple game-theoretic model to illustrate the capacity of the Internet to facilitate the emergence of viable transnational communities. In the third and final section, three case studies are presented showing how some international regimes are currently attempting to utilize the Internet to facilitate a more democratic mode of operation. The focus here is on the World Trade Organization, the International Organization for Standardization and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.
PREFACE
The emergence of the Internet has transformed the way in which we experience the private and public spheres. On the one hand the Internet has opened new ways for projecting private experiences into the public sphere using various webcast technologies. On the other hand, the Internet promises to reshape the boundaries of the public space. Political communication no longer needs to be centered on face-toface interactions undertaken in uniquely designed spaces, but can be accessed from the private domain through atomized computer screens and electronically mediated interchanges. What does this blurring of old boundaries mean for the body politic?
This paper seeks to address this broad question with reference to one particular facet of the public sphere: the broadening realm of transnational law.
The increasing encroachment of international legal norms into the previously secluded boundaries of the nation state has raised questions about the legitimacy of this emergent system of governance. This paper explores how the Internet might be used to address some of these concerns. In doing so, the paper moves us beyond questions about the Internet's impact on established domestic institutions to examine its role as creator of wholly new representative structures, outside the national context. It is argued that new information and communication technologies (ICTs) do offer significant potential for the development of more inclusive transnational governing structures, but that the realization of such structures depends on focused intervention by civil society and the support of existing national and international bureaucracies.
Any theorising about the possibility of Net induced democratisation at the international level, therefore, must be situated within familiar analytical frameworks about 'collective action' and 'interest mobilization'. Thus, while the focus is on these new, extra-national legal actors, the paper also makes the point that technology alone cannot engineer change. The adoption of new ICTs, even among newly forming representative bodies without a long history or large constituencies, is subject to broader environmental constraints.
The emergence of new forms of global law that operate beyond the traditional geopolitical boundaries of the state-system is a key component of the globalization
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Working Paper # 3-04 process (Teubner 1997; Perez 2002 depends on the ability of the affected community to participate, in a meaningful way, in the design and implementation of the ruling norms. In order to be legitimate, some measures need to be in place to ensure that public consent and control is provided.
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The key issue, therefore, facing these new global legal and political entities, in the light of these challenges, is whether they can devise processes through which these ideals can be realised. Properly responding to this democratic deficit requires the development of inclusive and non-hierarchical decision-making structures, which could break the confines of the current nationalistic order, and offer the public direct access to processes of global norm-production. This paper focuses on the possible contribution that the Internet can make, and is making, to the development of these novel decision-making structures. In particular, it examines whether the Internet can offer ways to incorporate the public more meaningfully into the infrastructure of global legal regimes. This view of legitimacy stands in contrast to non-procedural accounts that are based on the compatibility of a regime with a particular understanding of the common good. Such accounts are problematic since they presuppose an agreed-upon definition of the common good, and leave unresolved the question of the criteria for determining compatibility. For more extensive discussions of these issues see Bodansky (1999), and Weiler (1997 
I. THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMACY AND THE WESTPHALIAN

PARADIGM
According to the Westphalian, or inter-governmental paradigm of international regime formation, legitimacy rests with state consent -either to a specific set of norms (treaties) or to the establishment of a body with norm-producing powers such as the WTO (Caldwell 1996: 146) . The consent of the state is secured through the actions of its authorised agents (state officials), and thus is only indirectly related to the wishes of the state citizenry (Petersmann 1999 The legitimacy of these new forms of a-national law, therefore, requires the development of new, cross-border structures of decision-making, which will provide the public with more meaningful forms of participation. The argument of this paper is that the Internet can provide such novel participatory structures through its ability to deliver 'direct deliberation' on a global scale. Direct deliberation interprets the democratic process as a 'collective decision-making that proceeds through direct participation by and reason-giving between and among free and equal citizens' (Cohen and Sabel 1997: 314) . It defines the 'public arena' in which such deliberation takes place as a product of common aims or concerns, and not as a reflection of national identities. This interpretation of democracy as a legitimate way of 'living together' does not rely on the capacity of all-embracing deliberation to produce consensus (and hence, consent). Rather, the legitimizing force of democratic deliberation is postulated to rise from a culturally-shared belief in the moral legitimacy of decisions, which were made through a fair and open dialogue. It is the openness of the deliberation process to all those concerned, and its relative fairness, which gives the democratic process its legitimizing power.
II. MODEL OF ELECTRONIC PARTICIPATION
This section seeks to assess whether the Internet can be used to construct more inclusive governance structures in the transnational domain. It considers in that context the differences between electronic and non-electronic participatory schemes.
These questions are considered through a simple game-theoretic model, which is based on the understanding of politics as a problem of 'collective action'. The goal of using game theory here is to expose the strategic dilemmas that can arise from the introduction of a transnational scheme of e-participation. This exposition brings out more clearly both the various advantages of the Internet as a participatory medium, and its basic limitations.
Constructing a model of e-participation requires a clear definition of 'electronic
democracy' or 'electronic participation'. It is possible to distinguish in this context between three different ways in which the Internet can be harnessed to the democratic process. First, the Internet constitutes an efficient means for achieving transparency.
Indeed, as one author has put it 'The Internet can make genuinely public what has only been nominally public' (Starr 2000) . Transparency is a necessary condition for the evolution of meaningful deliberation. Second, the Internet can be used by the international organization to elicit public comments on its normative output. Here, the
Internet is used to facilitate uni-directional communication: the international organization -placed at the receiving end -is responsible for collecting, interpreting and judging the comments of the public. The deliberation process is controlled by the international organization. The Internet is not used here as a medium for conversation but only as a cost-effective delivery service, which carries messages between disassociated individuals and the relevant institution. Finally, the Internet can be used also to facilitate wide-ranging dialogue between the institution and the public and within the public itself. Under this multi-directional model none of the communicators has exclusive control over the timing and content of communications. Only this last option comes near the ideal picture of 'directly-deliberative democracy'.
The model developed in this section is based on a uni-directional participation scheme. This scheme was favoured for several reasons. First, from a pragmatic perspective it is probably a more realistic assessment of the scope of ambition among international institutions for new forms of public dialogue. Second, it is a simpler model which retains the basic collective action dilemma that participation on an international level encounters, and that the Internet can purportedly help resolve.
Thus, heuristically it is preferable. The model, following Olsonian logic, envisages participation as a game whereby 'public' (or normative) goods are secured as benefits that accrue to the (transnational) community as a whole, leaving costs to be borne (exclusively) by the individual participators. I leave the exact nature of the public good undefined. In our context it will usually reflect the possibility of bringing about a change in the content of a proposed transnational norm (hence the term 'normative good').
The structure of the model is as follows. Vi is a function of predetermined individual political/ideological preferences.
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From an individual perspective there are two major impediments to collective action.
First, because the public good (Pg) could be provided (with probability α) only if the threshold K is achieved, any individual effort that would be made without the presence of additional K-1 contributions will be wasted (with probability 1). Thus, a player who believes that there will be, overall, only K-1 contributions (including his),
will not find it in his interest to participate. Second, a player who believes that there are K participants (beside him) will have little incentive to participate as his voice will not add to the probability of the public good being provided. 9 This means that -for an individual to contribute -it is not enough that the (expected) value of the public good should be greater than the cost of participation. Rather, a rational individual will make an effort to participate only if he believes that he is the Kth participant, that is, that he has a pivotal role in generating the public-good. Before investing resources in the political game the individual would need, then, some assurance that his contribution is indeed critical. This turns the game of transnational deliberation into an 'assurance game'.
A preliminary condition for the emergence of a 'participatory community' is the existence of at least K individuals for whom the participation cost is smaller or equal to the expected value of the public good. The individual rationality condition requires, then, that:
where Ci is the cost of participation and Vi(Pg) measures the expected utility of i from the public good. Assume that N' people (of the total community N) satisfy this basic condition. Under these assumptions the model anticipates two types of Nash equilibrium:
that is all the possible combinations of K contributors out of the set N' of potential contributors. 12 We can interpret this number as representing the number of potential coalitions. I will denote the set of these coalitions as Bk (with Xj ∈ Bk denoting a particular coalition). 
10 Another implicit condition is that the net value of the political action -(Vi(Pg) -Ci) -is larger than the (net) value of any alternative action -the outside option -that the individual could have pursued instead (in or outside the Net). Otherwise, even if condition (1) is satisfied, the individual will not take this path. 11 I assume that k≠1 and k≠N. It is assumed also that the rules of the game, as well as the values of all the relevant factors (e.g., of K, N', α) are common-knowledge. 12 Each of these combinations represents a stable Nash Equilibrium because none of the players has an incentive to deviate from it unilaterally. None of the N-N' players will have an incentive to participate because for them Ci > Vi(Pg)). None of the N'-K players will have an incentive to participate because, although for them Ci ≤ Vi(Pg), by not participating they can save Ci but still get Vi(Pg)). As to the K participants -because each of them believes (by assumption) that he is 'pivotal', he would not defect because this would mean losing Vi(Pg)-Ci. 13 Since Equation (2) points out two important features of the criticality question. First, when the value of N' (the group of potential contributors) is relatively large compared to K (the threshold community) the importance of each individual contribution decreases (since B approaches A). Second, because the value of A is likely to rise quickly with N', the value of B is likely to remain high even in small ratios of (N'-K) / N'; this will contribute again to a diminishing sense of criticality by an individual participant.
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14 It should be noted that the model outlined above does not purport to explain the process by which a particular equilibrium or coalition (out of these multifarious equilibria) is eventually selected. Extensive research on this so-called emergence puzzle, however, has revealed that larger groups exhibit lower levels of cooperation than smaller ones. The main reasons for this are thought to be the decline in perceived efficacy among individuals in a group as it expands. Basically those in larger groups are less likely to believe that their contribution is essential for the provision of the public good. This is consistent with the interpretation offered to equation (2) above.
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In addition, the decreasing opportunities for communication in large groups are also seen to adversely influence the sense of solidarity and mutual commitment in these groups (Colman 1995: 218-221) . 16 Overall, however, this research has still not resolved the problem of equilibria selection; it has only identified the kind of conditions in which the prospects for cooperation increase -the exact profile of this emerging cooperation remained uncertain (Ostrom 2000) . While the number of potential coalitions was reduced by 1/3 it remained high enough to discount any sense of individual criticality, making 'free-riding' an appealing option. Note, however, that if all the members of the community would follow this line of reasoning none would contribute. Thus, i is facing two plausible, but contradictory predictions, in which his investment is portrayed as both critical and redundant. 15 For studies that examined the extent to which the perception of 'individual efficacy' plays a role in the decision of individuals to contribute to the provision of public goods, see Colman (1995: 215-221) , and Yamagishi and Cook (1993) . 16 Ostrom et al (1994) conducted a thorough investigation of the problem of public-good provision under various laboratory settings. Their findings indicate that adding opportunities for communication in the game yields, in a very consistent fashion, higher levels of cooperation. See, Ostrom et al (1994: 145-169, 195-199) . 17 The profile of any selected equilibrium (or coalition) should be treated probably as a random phenomenon, caused by accidental fluctuations and unplanned perturbations in the border between The introduction of the notion of transaction cost adds an additional constraint to the set of feasible equilibria. 20 To be viable any potential coalition should be able to fund the coordination costs; that is, the aggregate (net) value of the public good, within any viable coalition, should be higher than CT. Formally, this idea could be represented in the following way:
This condition could be interpreted in two different ways. A first interpretation assumes that this 'hidden' value will be extracted and utilized by a group-leader in society and consciousness. A similar uncertainty exists in the case of physical systems. See Kelso (1995:10) . 18 For this broad interpretation of the idea of transaction cost, see Calabresi (1991) . 19 To the critical role of 'assurance' in the emergence of cooperation in prisoner-dilemma type games, see, e.g., Hayashi et al (1999) . 20 Going beyond this image of 'transaction costs' as a constraint on the number of viable coalitions requires a very detailed description of the mechanism that will be used to counter any transaction barriers. The features of this mechanism (e.g., the intervention of a group-leader seeking to construct a threshold community) will determine a new game. As it is impossible to provide a complete catalogue of these potential mechanisms, the structure of this unfolding game, and the strategic dilemmas it generates, cannot be specified in advance. However, what is important in our context is that there are convincing empirical studies, which show that offering more opportunities for communication and assurance signals raises the prospects of cooperation. For an example of a concrete analysis, that explores the effect of a particular coordination mechanism (recommended contributions) on the voluntary provision of public goods, see Croson and Marks (2001) . order to finance the coordination effort. A second (and less literal) interpretation views this condition as an indicator of social concern rather than a fiscal attribute.
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This interpretation recognizes the possibility that some (but not all) of the coordination services will be provided and/or funded by external sources (e.g., public agency), without the presence of actual 'extraction' from the community. However, it assumes that for such external intervention to materialize, the external agency should be convinced that there is strong public interest in the provision of the public good.
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How will the introduction of electronic participation influence the results of this model? The first influence would be to reduce Ci. The term Ci consists of two main factors: the costs of gathering information on the subject of the political process (e.g., the details of a proposed international standard) and the participation costs (making your voice heard). 22 The introduction of the Internet reduces these costs. Getting information is now much easier, especially as more and more international institutions take seriously the demand for greater transparency (see the discussion in section III).
Further, the costs of responding to the information should decrease since the Internet opens up new and cheaper ways for submission of views. While the introduction of the Internet can also generate new types of costs such as information overload, these costs should be outweighed by the new efficiencies of retrieval and response, especially when users are focused on extracting particular information about a given normative dilemma.
A second, and even more crucial influence, concerns the coordination costs (CT). The introduction of the Internet should reduce, substantially, the transaction costs associated with organizing a threshold community. In particular, the Internet opens up new and cheaper ways for institutional entrepreneurs to take the lead and organize a particular coalition. 23 Coordinating a threshold community requires the group-leader to communicate with each of the group members. Such communication will usually contain information on the issue at hand, and a signal ensuring the criticality of the 21 Assuming some kind of institutional intervention does not mean that we should rule-out the potential role of private group leaders. Even if the public agency agrees to fund (or provide directly) some of the coordination services (e.g., website facilities) it could still leave the stage open for external leaders. 22 The introduction of the Internet should also reduce the opportunity costs of participation by reducing the time needed for participation.
addressee. The Internet should reduce substantially the costs of this communication,
by allowing the leader to use various automated tools for communication. Assuming that the introduction of the Internet has reduced the individual communication costs by a factor of λ, it is reasonable to assume that the coordination costs will be reduced by a factor of Kλ. 24 This reflects the simple intuition that the group-leader can use the Internet to interact simultaneously with all the members of the group. In the pre-Net era both Ci and CT have been (in the transnational context) prohibitively highblocking, in effect, the evolvement of transnational participatory schemes.
The introduction of Internet could thus turn the project of transnational participation into a truly practical option. The impact of the Net is not limited, however, to the issue of participation/coordination costs. The introduction of the Net could also influence the long-term dynamics of the transnational interaction. So far the participatory process was described as a single-shot process. 25 It was assumed that the participation would take place in the context of a particular discussion (e.g., around a specific transnational norm), and would not form an integral part of the law-making process.
The political community would have to be formed anew in each round of participation (with repeated investments of the 'fixed-cost' element of CT). With the Internet, the transforming of this 'scattered' process into a continuous one becomes much easier (and cheaper). 26 The Internet provides various cost-efficient means, through which an emerging transnational community could be kept alive through time. These include tools such as group lists, e-newsletters, chat-rooms, instant messaging and electronic archives. These different mechanisms enable both the facilitation of continuous conversation and the creation of (enduring) group memory. This kind of time-persistency is an essential element of a true polity. 27 In the pre-Net era, the cost of constructing such infrastructure on a global scale would have made it impossible to implement.
The Internet, then, is more than a cheap participation mechanism. Its extensive global reach and rich repertoire of community-sustaining techniques turn it into an essential tool in the effort to develop meaningful transnational democracy. Shifting the participation process into the electronic domain does not resolve, however, the basic collective-action dilemma that characterizes political action. Indeed, the model that was presented in this section makes clear that the emergence of e-participation cannot be taken for granted, and is strongly dependent on the availability of central direction.
By emphasizing the 'enabling' and anarchistic character of the Net, many writers have tended to overlook this dependency (e.g., Hammond and Lash 2000) , and its potential implications -in particular, the susceptibility of e-participation to hierarchical manipulation. Thus, one of the challenges facing those seeking to institutionalize mechanisms of e-participation is to find ways to promote coordinated activity yet keep the sponsors of such activity accountable.
III. USE OF THE INTERNET BY INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
Having outlined, in theory, the usefulness of the Internet for facilitating wider involvement by civic actors in the creation and operation of international regimes, this section examines how far international organisations are meeting these expectations in practice. Three major global regulatory bodies are considered -the World Trade Organisation (WTO) which replaced the GATT in 1995; the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) that deals with issues of technical standardization; and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) which regulates the system of domain names on the Internet. These organisations present an interesting mix for analysis in terms of their overall Internet experience and embeddedness in the statesystem. The WTO and the ISO are both from the pre-Net era. The WTO, as a traditional treaty-based system, is rooted strongly in the Westphalian tradition, while the ISO is more of a hybrid organisation in that its members are not governments, but national standardization bodies from some 140 countries. The ISO remains closely linked to the state system, however, in that some members are private bodies, e.g., the British Standards Institution, whereas some are governmental agencies, e.g., the French Standards Agency, AFNOR (Association française de normalisation).
ICANN, by contrast, is a new, Internet-spawned phenomenon that relies extensively on new technology to carry out its functions. While it relies to a certain degree on the backing of the state-system, its jurisdiction and legitimacy are highly dependent on the non-governmental sector. Given its more intimate connection to the Internet, and greater detachment from established national actors, ICANN is anticipated to be more adept in exploiting the innovative and participatory uses of the technology than either the WTO or the ISO.
The paper turns first to the case of the WTO. The establishment of the WTO was a triumphant culmination of a long institutionalization process that began in 1947 with the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Jackson 1997: 31-78 ). The WTO is concerned, primarily, with the facilitation of transnational commerce and the abolishment of trade-barriers. The WTO differs from its predecessor, the GATT, in two key respects. First, unlike the weak dispute settlement (DS) system of the GATT, the WTO DS system is highly independent, and is much more immune to political pressures. Its establishment has marked the creation of a new and independent source of normative power in the global arena (Perez 2001: 73-103) . Second, the normative setting of the WTO is far more ambitious than that of the GATT. It is not limited to a single trade-sector or to one type of regulatory barrier, but reflects a broad attempt to integrate the global economy. This jurisdictional expansion has resulted in an increased incidence of conflicts between trade and other societal objectives such as environmental protection, and a growing public critique of its legitimacy and accountability (Esty 1999; Charnovitz 1996) .
One way in which the WTO has sought to respond to this perception of a democratic deficit has been to increase the transparency of its operations, and to do so it has turned to the Web. Almost all of the WTO documents, including secretariat reports, committee protocols and judicial decisions are accessible on-line -no mean feat especially when one considers the cloak of secrecy that characterized GATT proceedings. In addition, the WTO sought to promote wider public 'engagement' in its affairs, and again the Internet was seen as a crucial part of this strategy. A dedicated 'community/forum's section was created on the website that was designed to serve the interests of the media, NGOs, and the general public. The goal being to 'provide an opportunity for the public to comment on the WTO, its activities, and the trading system'. regime of the WTO has in effect upgraded their status, making it much more difficult for both private players and states to disregard them (Perez 1998 (Perez , 2004 . Further, despite the apparently specialized and remote nature of their work, such bodies do have farreaching social implications that merit deeper public scrutiny. Perhaps the strongest example of such societal importance is the ISO and its work in developing a new set of environmental standards -the ISO 14000 series -covering a range of practices relating to management systems, auditing, performance evaluation, labelling, and life cycle assessment (Murray 1999: 40-49) . Unlike some of ISO other products, the ISO 14000 series is not really 'technical' -in the sense that it is not comprised of detailed technological or emissions protocols. The ISO 14000 series has a broader agenda, which is to teach organizations, in a general and abstract fashion, 'how to think about environmental problems'. Furthermore, this normative agenda is not limited to the corporate realm. The ISO 14000 series seeks, in effect, to provide a comprehensive discourse -which would be used by society as a whole -for judging the environmental behaviour of organizations.
Despite the broad normative implications of this series, however, the project was not subjected to a wide deliberative process (UNCTAD 1996) . The standard-making process in the ISO overall provides few opportunities for public participation. 32 The main 'legislative' work is carried out by ISO technical committees and subcommittees; only ISO members have the right to participate in the work of the various committees, i.e. to receive drafts, make comments, and approve ISO standards. 33 The ISO online presence does little to break the 'closure' of its norm-32 A thorough discussion of ISO 'constitutional' framework is beyond the scope of this paper. For a more detailed discussion, see UNCTAD Report (UNCTAD 1996: 21-40 The Net -one of the key social domains of the modern society -is also subject to extensive regulation by a-national sources. With the growing importance of the Net as a medium for communication, the question of its control has become an issue of deep social concern. Since its early years of popular use the net has changed from a space of absolute freedom to a more regulated environment (Lessig 2000 two levels the -generic top-level domain name space (i.e. 'com', 'net', and 'org' etc.) -and the unique country-code top-level domains such as 'uk' for United Kingdom and 'il' for Israel. One of the main concerns that accompanied its creation was how to ensure that this new body would respect the egalitarian and free spirit of the Internet.
To achieve this ICANN was founded on the principle of inclusive governance; it was recognized from the start though that implementing this principle could only be achieved Julia Roberts, to Dior, Penguin Books, and Nandos. 37 While the establishment of this system was seen as necessary to further development of the Internet it raises difficult 35 ICANN was incorporated under California law as a 'public benefit corporation', for a more detailed description of ICANN and its history see: www.icann.org and Weinberg (2000: 192-213 ICANN's strategy represented a bold attempt to build a new type of global governance. However, ICANN governance structure, and in particular the at-large programme, have been subject to increasing internal criticism. The view within ICANN was that a system of electronic voting that is based on email addresses to identify individuals -the system that was used in the 2000 election -cannot reliably represent public interest. It was argued that this mechanism is 'administratively and financially unworkable on a global scale for a sizeable electorate, and fraught with potential dangers ranging from capture to outright fraud' (ICANN-At-Large-StudyCommittee 2001). The dual qualification system, which was used in the 2000 elections, and required each voter to have an email and postal address as physical proof of existence, was seen as cumbersome and highly impractical (ibid). In view of these difficulties ICANN adopted, after a long process of consultation, alternative participatory mechanisms, which were less ambitious in terms of their democratic profile, but, arguably, should allow it to serve more efficiently the interests of the 38 See the detailed discussion in Chander (2003) and Armon (2003 Internet community (Lynn 2002) . These reforms, were strongly criticized by external observers. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The paper began with the question of whether the Internet opens the way for meaningful participation in the production of transnational norms. The answer to this question was provided in two ways. First, I explored theoretically whether the Internet could provide conditions that were supportive of participatory communities at the international level by reducing both the costs of individual participation and the transaction costs associated with the construction of a threshold community. The
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For a detailed critique of ICANN's recent structural reforms see, Klein (2001) , Nunziato (2003) and Palfrey (2004) . For an attempt to respond to this critique (by ICANN official) see
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Working Paper # 3-04 capacity of the Internet to reduce barriers of time and space along with its ability to sustain a high volume of multi-directional communications (connectivity), and to provide efficient archive services (memory) were seen as providing very strong potential for the efficient organisation of transnational political action. I then turned to a series of 'real world' examples of international organizations that were applying the Internet to their operating practices for some insight into how far these theoretical expectations could be realized. The evidence from our three examples of the WTO, the ISO and ICANN revealed that these organizations were making substantial efforts to develop Internet-based participatory mechanisms, although, admittedly, none of these mechanisms (for different reasons) can be said to fully realize the potential of the Internet.
One of the key lessons to have emerged from the game-theory model, however, was that despite its various advantages, the Internet does not eliminate the collectiveaction problem that permeates any political endeavour. The emergence of spontaneous cooperation over the Net cannot be taken for granted. This was certainly demonstrated in the three case studies analysed, since all revealed a reliance on some form of central coordination to facilitate online participation. Such dependency on centralized direction of course introduces additional tensions in terms of the risks to free expression and the emergence of technocratic elite. The challenge here, therefore, is to devise mechanisms that could ensure the meaningfulness of the deliberation process, despite the existence of such 'residual' authority. Take, for example, the transnational process of standard setting. It is possible to imagine several mechanisms, by which the integrity of the deliberative process could be guaranteed. First, the constitution of the international organization should ensure that the public is given a meaningful role in decision-making structures. The organization could be obliged, for example, to collect a certain, threshold number of public comments before submitting a standard for approval, and to incorporate a specified number of these comments into the final rule.
There could also be a requirement for making public the reasons for rejecting any civic proposals. Electronically available archives of public comments should allow readers to check these institutional commitments. Such obligations could counter the current tendency of public officials to discount electronic mail, which is perceived as McLaughlin (2003) .
'cheap talk', and give more credence to traditional modes of communication (Bimber 2001: 3) .
Aside from these more generic barriers to developing meaningful forms of Internet- E-democracy, therefore, does not resolve some of the chief dilemmas of democratic political action. However, it does offer one of the most promising paths by which the public can be incorporated into the 'making' of global law. As was indicated in section III above this process has already begun. The experiences of the WTO, ISO and ICANN provide useful lessons for utilizing the new ICTs to support new participatory schemes. The challenge society is facing today is to continue this experimentation process and extend it to other transnational domains.
